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1. Introduction 
Is there an inbuilt tendency for productivity and icome across the globe to converge? If we 
look at capitalist development in a long run perspectiv  the answer is clear. The long run 
trend since the so-called industrial revolution hasbeen towards divergence, not convergence 
in productivity and income. For instance, according to economic historian David Landes, 250 
years ago the difference in income or productivity per head between the richest and poorest 
country in the world was approximately 5:1, while more recently this difference has increased 
to 400:1 (Landes 1998). However, in spite of this long run trend towards divergence, there 
are many examples of (initially) backward countries that – at different times – have managed 
to narrow the gap in productivity between themselves and the frontier countries, in other 
words, to “catch up”. The current frontier country – the United States – was itself once on a 
catch-up path vis-à-vis the then economically and technologically leading country of the 
time, the United Kingdom. Japan in the decades before and after the Second World War is 
another well-known example and the so-called “Asian tigers”  from the 1960s onwards. 
China and India are examples of countries that may h ve joined this path more recently 
(although they still have a long way to go).  
 
The question that suggests itself is how this diversity in patterns of development can be 
explained. Why do some countries succeed in catching up, while others fall behind? Is it 
related to the development of “capabilities” of a type that other countries fail to create? In 
fact, this is one of the oldest and most controversial i sues in economics. It can be traced back 
at least a few hundred years, when politicians and industrialists in countries such as the 
United States and Germany started to debate what types of  capabilities and policies that were 
needed in order to catch up with the then world leader, the United Kingdom (see Chang 
2002). 
 
In section 2 we start the search for what these critical factors for catch-up may be. We do this 
by reviewing some of the main arguments that have be n presented in the literature and 
discussing what empirical measures these give (or may give) rise to. Traditionally, much 
theorizing in this area focused on the role of capital accumulation for growth and 
development.  Gradually this has given way to a more “institutionalist” view, focusing on 
how to get the institutional conditions for well-working markets, including the capital market, 
right. More recently we have seen development of a  more “knowledge based” approach, 
according to which catching up (or lack of such) depends not so much on capital 
accumulation as the abilities of a country to create nd exploit knowledge (and respond to 
challenges arising in connection with this). This naturally leads to a focus on what influences 
the capacity of a country for creating and exploiting knowledge, including relevant policy 
aspects, and concepts such as “social capability” and “ bsorptive capacity” have  emerged as 
important focusing devices within this approach.  
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Having considered the various arguments and the empirical measures they give rise to we 
start in section 3 on the synthesis work. In recent y ars the quality and availability of data on 
different aspects of development have improved a lot, and this might give researchers a new 
opportunity for investigating the reasons behind the large differences in economic 
performance in more depth.  Rather than picking indiv dual indicators we follow Adelman 
and Morris (1965, 1967) and Temple and Johnson (1998) in mapping the most central 
elements with the help of factor analysis, taking ito account a variety of different indicators 
and sources. Factor analysis is a useful tool in the present context because it allows us to 
reduce the complexity entailed by a large number of different (but often mutually correlated) 
indicators into a smaller number of synthetic dimensio s. The analysis clearly illustrates the 
multidimensional character of “capabilities”, resulting in four different dimensions, which we 
label “innovation system”, “governance”, “political system” and “openness”, respectively. 
We examine the relationships with economic development and analyse to what extent these 
capabilities may help us understand why some countries excel economically, while other 
countries continue to be poor.  
 
2. What are the most critical factors for development? Taking stock of the literature. 
Intuitively, most people easily accept the idea that knowledge and economic development is 
intimately related, and hence that access to knowledge should be regarded as a vital factor. 
However, this is not the way different levels of development used to be explained by 
economists. From the birth of the so-called “classical political economy” – a term invented 
by Karl Marx - two centuries ago, what economists have focused on when trying to explain 
differences in income or productivity is accumulated capital per worker. Similarly, 
differences in economic growth have been seen as reflecting different rates of capital 
accumulation. This perspective arguably reflects the important role played by 
“mechanization” as a mean for productivity advance during the so-called (first) industrial 
revolution, the period during which the frame of refe nce for much economic reasoning was 
formed. Closer to our own age Robert Solow adopted this perspective in his so-called 
“neoclassical growth theory” (Solow 1956). The theory predicted that, under otherwise 
similar circumstances, investments in poor countries (e.g. those with little capital) would be 
more profitable than in the richer ones, so that the former would be characterized by higher 
investment and faster economic growth than the latter. As a consequence of this logic, a 
narrowing of the development gap (so-called “convergence”) should be expected. 
 
It soon became clear, however, that this could not be the whole story. When students of 
economic growth started to apply this perspective to long run growth processes in the United 
States and elsewhere, they found that capital accumulation, or factor accumulation more 
generally, could only explain a relatively small share of actual growth (Abramovitz 1956). 
This finding has since been repeated many times for di ferent data sets.3 Moreover, as pointed 
out above, the prediction that global capitalist dynamics would be accompanied by a 
convergence in income and productivity between initially poor and rich countries was not 
borne out of the facts either.  
 
From capital accumulation to institutions and geography 
It should be emphasized, however, that Solow’s theory was based on standard neoclassical 
assumptions on how markets and agents perform, which m ght not fit very well in developing 
countries. Hence, one possible explanation for the failure of many countries to catch up could 
                                               
3 See Fagerberg (2004) for an overview and discussion and Easterly and Levine (2001) for  recent evidence on 
the subject. 
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be that markets did not work properly, agents did not receive the right incentives, the 
government interfered too much in the economy etc., in short; that “the rules of the game” 
were not adhered to. Following the terminology used by Douglas North (1981) such rules are 
customary called institutions. But in common parlance as well as in some scholarly work, the 
concept institution is also used in a broader sense, to include not only rules and norms but 
also organizations and other types of collaborative activities that may influence individual 
behaviour.  
 
Taking issue with the role of institutions for growth and development Glaeser et al. (2004) 
argue that institutions in the narrow sense of the term (rules, norms) should be expected to be 
relatively stable over time. This follows from the view that such rules and norms are deeply 
embedded into society and, hence, change slowly.  However, the authors point out that many 
commonly used indicators of “institutions” are far rom stable. Hence,   they conclude that 
such indicators in many cases do not reflect “institutions” in the above sense, but rather 
political choices and policies pursued by governments, which may be assumed to be subject 
to more frequent changes than historically given rules and norms. They also show that if the 
analysis is restricted to indicators of institutions i  the narrow sense (reflecting constitution or 
judicial system) and their relationship with levels and growth of GDP, the correlations are 
rather weak, in contrast to what can be shown to hold f r the more broadly defined 
“institutional variables” (which Glaeser et al. see as reflecting political choices). Thus, 
institutions in the more narrow sense are not good predictors of successful catch-up. What 
seem to be of greater importance are the policies actually pursued.   
 
In recent years, a sizeable empirical literature has emerged trying to expand on the type of 
analysis just presented in various directions, for instance by pushing the search for 
explanatory factors far back in time (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002), or by taking into account 
other types of exogenous variables that might have an impact on development (and policies), 
such as climate, exposure to diseases, geography (access to sea for instance), ethnic diversity 
etc. (Sachs et al. 2004, Masters and MacMillan 2001, Bloom et al. 2003, Alesina et al. 2003).  
Arguably, it is difficult to deny that factors of a historical or geographical nature may have an 
impact on long-run growth. Hence, it appears pertinnt to control for this when testing for the 
impact of other factors, and we will follow this practice here. It might be noted, however, that 
in many cases there is conflicting evidence and interpretation about the impact of history, 
geography and nature on growth (Glaeser et al. 2004). One reason for this may be that 
variables reflecting different causes sometimes are so strongly correlated that little can be 
said with certainty (apart from, perhaps, that there is a joint impact). Alesina et al. (2003, p. 
183), for instance, conclude on this basis that “In the end one has to use theory and priors to 
interpret our correlations”.   Another possibility, pointed out already by Moses Abramovitz 
(1994a), could be that the problems that such conditi s give rise to, may also spur the 
creation of new knowledge and new social arrangements, which eventually may totally 
eliminate the problems (and even making society better off over a long-run).  This leads us to 
the role of knowledge in growth and development. 
 
Knowledge and development 
“Knowledge”, or “knowing things”, may take many forms. It may be theoretical, based on an 
elaborate understanding of the phenomena under scrutiny. But it may also be practical, based 
on, say, cause-effect relationships that have been shown to hold in practice, although a total 
understanding of the underlying causes may be lacking. It may be created through search or 
learning but it may also be acquired through education or training or simply by observing 
what others do and trying to imitate it. The creation (or acquisition) of knowledge does not 
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require an economic motive (or effect), although this is quite common. The subset of 
knowledge that deals with how to produce and distribu e goods and services, which is what 
interest economists most, is usually labelled “technology”.  An open question is if the concept 
technology only refers to knowledge about physical processes (“hardware”), or if it also 
includes knowledge about, say, how to organize/manage these (“software”). For the study of 
growth and development the latter, broad interpretation of the term is probably the most 
meaningful. Arguably, mastery of physical processes i  of dubious value if you don’t know 
how to embed these in a well-organized production and distribution system. 
 
Traditionally, economic theorists have faced great problems in incorporating knowledge 
(technology) into their analysis of development. This ad to do with a particular view on 
knowledge that had come to dominate economics; knowledge as a body of information, freely 
available to all interested, that can be used over and over again (without being depleted). 
Arguably, if this is what knowledge is about, it should be expected to benefit everybody all 
over the globe to the same extent, and cannot be invoked to explain differences in growth and 
development. It is understandable, therefore, that the first systematic attempts to 
conceptualise the relationship between knowledge and development did not come from the 
economics mainstream but from economic historians. The economic historian Alexander 
Gerschenkron set the stage for much of the subsequent lit rature (Gerschenkron 1962).4 
Rather than something that exists in the public domain and can be exploited by anybody 
everywhere free of charge, technological knowledge, whether created through learning or 
organized R&D, is in this tradition seen as deeply rooted in the specific capabilities of private 
firms and their networks/environments, and hence not easily transferable. Compared with the 
traditional neoclassical growth theory discussed earlier writers working in this tradition 
painted a much bleaker picture of the prospects for catch-up.5  According to this latter view 
catch-up is not something that can normally be expected to occur only by market forces left 
alone, but requires a lot of effort and institution-building on the part of the backward country 
(Abramovitz 1986, 1994 a,b). 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s economists’ interest in the possible role of knowledge 
(technology) for growth and development increased a lot. On the theoretical front an 
important development was the emergence of the so-called “new growth theory” (Romer 
1986, 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992) according to which differences in economic growth 
and development across countries should be understood as the outcome of differences in 
endogenous knowledge accumulation within (largely national) boarders. Although some 
newly created technological knowledge may spill over from one setting (firm or country) to 
another one (and hence benefit the latter at least as much as the former), there are according 
to this approach sufficient impediments to this process (being legal, such as intellectual 
property rights, or more informal in nature) to secur  that in most cases the lion’s share of the 
benefits will accrue to the setting in which the knowledge is created. This leads to similar 
conclusions with respect to the prospects for catch-up and convergence as the more informal, 
historically oriented tradition discussed above. Together, these two strands of research, which 
both focus on the role of knowledge in development though through different lenses, have 
inspired a lot of new work aiming at identifying the various factors or capabilities that affect 
the extent to which developing countries succeed in exploiting the global pool of knowledge 
to their own benefit. 
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 The starting point for much of the work on capabilities and development was 
Gerschenkron’s historical analyses of European catch-up with the then technologically and 
economically leading nation, the United Kingdom.  Gerschenkron (1962) pointed out that 
although the technological gap between a frontier country and a laggard represents “a great 
promise” for the latter (a potential for high growth through imitating frontier technologies), 
there are also various problems that may prevent backw rd countries from reaping the 
potential benefits to the full extent. His favourite example was the German attempt to catch 
up with Britain more than a century ago. When Britain industrialized, technology was 
relatively labour intensive and small scale. But in the course of time technology became 
much more capital and scale intensive, so when Germany entered the scene, the conditions 
for entry had changed considerably. Because this, Gerschenkron argued, Germany had to 
develop new institutional instruments for overcoming these obstacles, above all in the 
financial sector, “instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an established 
industrial country” (ibid). He held these experiencs to be valid also for other technologically 
lagging countries. In short, to use a more recent trminology, Gerschenkron argued that 
catch-up by poorer countries should be expected to be “conditional” on certain types of 
capability-building. 
 
Moses Abramovitz, arguing along similar lines as Gerschenkron, also placed emphasis on the 
potential for catch-up by late-comers which he defined as follows: “This is a potential that 
reflects these countries’ greater opportunity to advance by borrowing and adapting the best 
practice technology and organization of more productive economies” (Abramovitz 1994b, p. 
87). He suggested that differences in countries’ abilities to exploit this potential might to 
some extent be explained in differences in so-called “social capability”.6 These are some of 
the aspects of social capability that Abramovitz emphasized as particularly relevant:7 
- technical competence (level of education),  
- experience in the organization and management of large scale enterprises, 
- financial institutions and markets capable of mobilizing capital on a large scale,  
- honesty and trust,   
- the stability of government and its effectiveness in defining (enforcing) rules and 
supporting economic growth. 
 
The concept social capability soon became very popular in applied work, so popular that it 
may in fact be difficult to find a published paper in this area that does not make a reference to 
it. However, the concept is as Abramowitz himself noted8 notoriously difficult to 
operationalize and this has left a wide scope for different interpretations. In fact, as we shall 
see, in many practical applications it assumed to be identical to some measure of educational 
attainment, which, although arguably an important aspect of social capability, clearly is a 
more narrow perspective than what Abramovitz had in mi d.   
 
Another popular concept in the applied literature on growth and development that touches on 
some of the same issues is “absorptive capacity”. Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal who 
suggested the term defined it as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
                                               
6 The term “social capability” comes from Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973). 
7  This list is based on Abramovitz  (1986, p. 387-390) and, in particular, two papers he published during 1994, 
see Abramovitz (1994a p. 34-35, 1994b, p. 88). 
8  The concept is, as Abramovitz himself admitted, quite “vaguely” and “poorly” defined (Abramovitz 1994a, p. 
24 and 36). 
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information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 
128). They saw it as largely dependent on the firm’s prior related knowledge, which in turn 
was assumed to reflect its cumulative R&D. However, they also noted that the path 
dependent nature of cumulative learning might make it difficult for a firm to acquire new 
knowledge created outside its own specialized field, and that it therefore was important for 
firms to retain a certain degree of diversity in its knowledge base through, among other 
things, nurturing linkages with holders of knowledg outside its own organization. Although 
their focus was on firms, many of the same considerations seem to apply at more aggregate 
levels, such as regions or countries, and the concept has won quite general acceptance.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the concept absorptive capacity refers not only to 
“absorption” in the received meaning of the term but also to the ability to exploit and create 
knowledge more generally. Cohen and Levinthal, being well aware of this, defended their 
position by arguing - with reference to relevant psychological literature - that the ability to 
assimilate existing and the ability to create new knowledge are so similar so there is no point 
in distinguishing between them (ibid, p. 130). Other researchers have placed more emphasis 
on making such a distinction, though.  Zahra and George (2002), in a review of the literature 
on the subject, argue that the skills required for creating and managing knowledge differ from 
those related to its exploitation and that the two herefore deserve to be treated and measured 
separately. They term the latter “transformative capacity”. Kim (1997) equates absorptive 
capacity with “technological capability” and identifies three different aspects of it; 
“innovation capability”, “investment capability” and “production capability”. In a similar 
vein Fagerberg (1988) and Fagerberg et al. (2004) distinguish between a country’s ability to 
compete on technology (what they term “technology competitiveness”) and its ability to 
exploit technology commercially independently of where it was first created (so-called 
“capacity competitiveness”). 
 
Thus there is by now a relatively large literature on the role of capabilities in development, 
conceptual and applied. However, as should be evident from the discussion, scholars in this 
area have suggested alternative concepts that are (at least partly) overlapping and often 
difficult to operationalize.  The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to an improved 
(and more transparent) relationship between conceptual and applied work in this area. We 
start by examining the relationship between concepts and indicators, noting that the 
availability of indicators  has improved a lot in recent years, and that this may prove to be 
beneficial not only for applied but also for conceptual work.    
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3. In search of a synthetic framework  
Based on the preceding discussion, Figure 1 presents an overview of the factors that we 
expect to be of particular relevance for catch-up, along with possible indicators of these 
factors. Starting from the bottom we first have factors related to differences in geography and 
nature. Such factors are important for development, specially at an early stage, and are 
therefore important to take into account, although there is perhaps not so much one can do 
about it.9 This also holds, to a large extent, for social characteristics that are the result of 
historical processes in the distant past, such as the roles of language(s), religion(s), ethnic 
groupings etc.  Arguably, a part of what is commonly termed “institutions” (e.g. rules and 
norms) may also fall under this category. For instace, the differences across regions in 
attitudes towards social collaboration studied by Putnam (1993) and labelled “social capital” 
were shown to have their roots way back in history and to be remarkably persistent. As a 
consequence we do not include these in what we call the “policy space”, shorthand for factors 
that within a reasonable time frame can be shaped through policy interventions. However, at 
any time there is a lot of scope for improvements i how society is governed (through 
appropriate political action). Hence, the quality of g vernance clearly belongs to the policy 
space. To this we also reckon the other aspects tha Abramovitz included in his social 
capability concept (such as organizational competenc , adequate financial infrastructure, 
education etc.) and factors associated with absorptive capacity and technological capability 
(such as, for instance, R&D infrastructure).   
 
 
                                               
9 However, with increasing knowledge, the social and economic effects of such given conditions may change 
(learning to cope with diseases, for instance). 
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Figure 1 
Capabilities and development - an integrated framework 
 
 
The concepts “technological capability” and “absorptive capacity” both refer to the ability to 
develop and exploit knowledge commercially, what in recent literature is often seen as 
reflecting the “innovation system” of a country (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993). We have 
several data sources that capture different aspects of his dimension.  As for “innovation 
capability” (to use the term suggested by Kim 1997)  research and development (R&D) 
expenditures measure some (but not all) resources that are used for developing new products 
or processes while patents count (patentable) inventions.10 The quality of a country’s science 
base, on which innovation and invention activities to some extent depend, are reflected in 
articles published in scientific and technical journals.11 In addition, a well-developed ICT 
infrastructure is widely acknowledged as a critical factor for the ability to develop and exploit 
new technology (knowledge). We include three indicators of ICT diffusion in the economy: 
personal computers, Internet users and fixed/mobile phone subscribers.  However, ICT is 
                                               
10 We use only patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to assure 
consistency in terms of criteria for novelty, originality, etc. 
11 We consider both patent and article counts as very reliable sources of quantitative data. Note, however, that 
the propensity to patent or publish varies considerably across scientific fields and sectors/industrie and that 
many innovations are not registered by these means. Moreover, there can be an upward language/regional bias 
for English-speaking nations and/or countries with a close links to the United States. No attempt was m de to 
correct for these possible biases. 
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equally (or even more) important for another dimensio  of technological capability 
emphasized by Kim, namely “production capability”. As an additional indicator of 
“production capability” we include the  spread of quality standards in production, for which 
the ISO 9000 certification seems to be most relevant and broadly available indicator.  
 
As pointed out in the literature on “absorptive capacity”, openness (or interaction) across 
country borders may serve as an important channel of t chnology transfer (or spillovers) from 
abroad. This issue is also very much emphasized in work inspired by the so-called “new 
growth theories” (see, for instance, Grossman and Helpman 1991 and Coe and Helpman 
1995).  Four channels of technology transfer across c untry borders have been examined in 
the literature: migration, licensing, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (for an overview 
see Cincera and Van Pottelsberghe 2001). However, du  to lack of data we only take into 
account the two latter, e.g.; diffusion of technology embodied in (merchandise) imports and 
(stock) of inward FDI. To avoid a bias against large economies (that for natural reasons 
trade/interact relatively more internally) both indicators were measured orthogonal to country 
size.12 
 
An important aspect of “social capability”, according to Abramovitz, is the ability to 
organize/manage large scale enterprises (“organizational capabilities”). This is, as 
acknowledged by Abramovitz himself, a hard thing to measure, particularly for a large 
sample of countries on different levels of development. Unfortunately, although we have 
scrutinized the available data sources for relevant information (se below), we have not been 
able to improve upon the existing literature in this respect. What most of the applied literature 
on the subject has done, following the influential study by Baumol et al. (1989), is to equate 
“social capability” with education, another aspect mphasized by Abramovitz. We include 
three indicators; the teacher-pupil ratio in primary education and the rates of enrolment13 in 
secondary and tertiary education. Abramovitz also pointed to the crucial role of country’s 
financial system for mobilizing resources for catching-up. We capture this aspect by the 
amount of credit (to the private sector) and by capitalization of companies listed in domestic 
capital markets. 14 
 
The importance of governance, policy and institutions, furnishing economic agents with 
incentives for creation and diffusion of knowledge, is also generally acknowledged in the 
literature. This holds not only  for Abramovitz, who as mentioned previously included several 
such aspects into his definition of “social capability”, but also for  writers from other strands 
such as, for instance, “new growth theory”. Although such factors often defy “hard” 
measurement,15 especially in a cross-country comparison, there exist some survey-based 
                                               
12 The variables were regressed against (the log of) country size (km2) and the residuals from these regressions 
were then used in our analysis.  
13 Note that we do not use indicators of enrolment in primary education, since this measure may have littl
impact on the labour force within the time span considered here, and has an upper boundary (“saturation” levels) 
that imply that  many if not most countries will have values close to 100%. Indicators with this propety are not 
well suited in factor analysis, because they tend to cluster into a single dimension due to this propety alone, 
regardless of the content.   
14 Note that Kim (1997) included finance (what he called “investment capability”) in his definition of 
“technological capability”, illustrating once more the partly overlapping nature of  some of the  most widely 
used concepts in this area. 
15 Among the aspects included in Figure 1 (and emphasized by Abramovitz), and for which survey-based 
indicators do exist but with too low coverage to all w inclusion here, are   “tolerance” and “honesty and trust” . 
In the more recent literature such aspects are often seen as related to “social capital”, e.g. the ability of a 
population to engage in socially beneficial, cooperative activities, (see Woolcock and Narayan 2000 for an 
overview). 
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measures that may be considered here.16 We include the following aspects (taken from such 
surveys):  
- law and order,  
- impartial courts,   
- protection of property rights,  
- how difficult it is to start/operate a business,  
- size of informal market (extent of corruption),  
- democratic versus autocratic government,  
- checks and balances in the political system,  
- degree of competition for posts in the executive and legislature and 
- the extent of political rights and civil liberties.  
 
These indicators clearly refer to institutions both in the broad sense (“quality of governance”) 
and in the narrow sense (“rules of the game”). 17 One of the challenges in the following will 
be to find ways to distinguish between these two aspects.   
 
Although measurability is a key issue for the present exercise, data availability proved to be a 
serious concern as well. Typically, most developed market economies  figure prominently 
among those with good coverage, while  many developing countries and former socialist 
economies lack data on many potentially useful indicators (and years). Based on an initial 
screening of data for 175 countries and more than 100 potential indicators we chose to 
include 115 countries and 25 indicators into the analysis (see Appendix 1 for details). Still 
there were a few missing data points for many countries/indicators. Excluding all countries 
with one or more missing observations would inevitably lead us in the direction of only 
considering a small group of highly developed countries. The same goes for indicators, not 
taking into account all indicators for which some country lacked data would lead to ignore 
many of the potentially most interesting explanatory factors.  In such cases we therefore 
chose to estimate the missing observations with the help of information on other, similar, 
indicators/countries (rather than reducing the sample).18  To ensure comparability over time 
and across countries, all indicators were measured in real units (quantity), deflated (if 
applicable) with population or GDP and on an increasing scale from low score (weak) to high 
score (strong).19  To limit the influence of shocks occurring in specific years, we express all 
indicators as three-year averages for the initial period over 1992-1994 and for the final period 
over 2002-2004.     
 
                                               
16 The sources of the data include expert panels and surveys provided by the Heritage Foundation, Freedom 
House, Polity IV Project, Transparency International, Amnesty International, World Economic Forum, PRS 
Group, Economic Intelligence Unit, various U.S. based State Agencies and others (see the Appendix A1 for 
details). 
17 Note that because of limited or no time-series, we cannot use the indicators developed by Djankov, et al. 
(2002), Botero, et al. (2004) and the World Bank’s “Investment Climate Survey” project. For the same reasons 
we cannot use the indicators on constitutional rules and judicial independence proposed by La Porta, et al (2004) 
and on legal procedures suggested by Djankov, et al. (2003). Nor do we not use the composite “governance 
matters” indicators developed by the World Bank because these,  as explained by Kaufmann et al. (2003, p. 31),  
by construction eliminate the time trend in the data (such as, for instance, a general trend towards more (less) 
democratic government which clearly would be of interest here). However, the sources for many of these 
indicators are often the same as those utilized here, so much of the information is taken into account in his 
study as well.  
18 See Appendix 1 for details on how this was done. 
19 If necessary we reversed scale of the indicators to have all of them in an increasing order, e.g. we use 
teacher-pupil ratio instead of the opposite. 
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4. Constructing composite variables: factor analysi 
Given the relatively large number of indicators there is obviously a lot of information to 
exploit in the analysis. But it goes without saying that it would not be meaningful to take all 
these indicators on board in, say, a regression analysis on economic growth, since many of 
them reflect slightly different aspects of the same reality and tend to be highly correlated 
(hence multicollinearity may be expected). How to combine this information into a smaller 
number of dimensions with a clear-cut economic interpretation? This is one of the key 
challenges confronting us in this study. 
 
The most widely used approach to construct composite variables is to use judgment to select 
the relevant indicators and then weigh these together (normally using equal weights – for 
survey of the literature see Archibugi and Coco 2005). This requires that we know in 
forehand which indicators to combine into a single dimension. However, if we lack this 
knowledge, this way of doing things runs into problems, as appears to be case here.  
Fortunately there is a well-developed branch of multivariate analysis, so-called “factor 
analysis”  , that is designed to advice on questions like this (Basilevsky 1994). It is based on 
the very simple idea that indicators referring to the same dimension are likely to be strongly 
correlated, and that we may use this insight to reduc  the complexity of a data set (consisting 
of many indicators) into a small number of composite variables, each reflecting a specific 
dimension of the total variance of the data set. This method has been widely used in the social 
sciences for a long time (Spearman 1904, Hotelling 1933) and was applied to the study of 
development in the pioneering study by Adelman and Morris (1965, 1967).  
 
Before we move to the factor analysis there are some issues that deserve mentioning. First, 
the indicators have to be standardized into a common format (deducting mean and dividing 
by standard deviation) before aggregating them into a c mposite.  We have standardized the 
indicators with the mean and standard deviation of the pooled data (from the initial and final 
period). This means that the change of a composite variable over time will reflect both 
changes in each country’s relative position (across countries) and changes in the absolute 
level of the underlying indicators (over time). In this way we take into account as much 
information  as possible. Second, variables should be relatively evenly distributed, e.g., 
variables with a “two sample split” (for example very high values for the developed countries 
and close to zero for the poorer ones) should be avoided and for the same reason outliers need 
to be dealt with. Simply excluding outliers from the sample may not be the best solution, as 
we then may lose the important evidence.  A log-transformation of the data set was shown to 
significantly reduce these problems. 20  
 
Factor analysis is carried out in two steps. First a solution is found in terms of number of 
factors to be retained and the share of the total variance that these together explain. Then, in a 
second step, the loadings of the various indicators on the factors are adjusted through so-
called “rotation” to maximize the differences between the factors (without changing the 
number of factors or the share of the total variance that these jointly explain). Hence, the 
choice of an appropriate method for rotation is obvi usly an important part of the analysis. 
For a long time so-called orthogonal rotations, such as “varimax normalized” rotation, were 
generally preferred in applied work, mainly because th se are computationally less 
demanding than the more complex alternatives. However, orthogonal rotations assume that 
the underlying composite variables that we are searching for are totally uncorrelated. 
                                               
20 Some variables containing zeros or negative scale h d to be rescaled to positive values. We used a simple 
rule by adding the minimum observed value in the sample, which delivers the transformation, to all of the 
observations in the sample. 
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Although an attractive feature in many respects (not the least in regression analysis) this is a 
very strong assumption that may be difficult to defend. Arguably, in the real world, there is a 
good deal of correlation between different social factors, and one would hence like to use a 
method that allows for that. Moreover, to achieve orth gonality (uncorrelatedness) 
adjustments in the loadings have to be made that may lead to strange results for individual 
countries. Therefore we use the more flexible “oblique” rotation, based on the “oblimin” 
method, which does not from the outset assume orthogonality. 
 
In Table 1 we present the results from a factor analysis on pooled data for the initial and final 
period for the 115 countries covered by the analysis (therefore 230 observations). The table 
presents the factor loadings (e.g. correlations betwe n the indicators and the retained factors) 
after oblimin oblique rotation. The analysis led to the selection of four principal factors 
jointly explaining 74% of the total variance.21 The first factor, which explains about one third 
of the total variance, correlates highly with several indicators associated with “technological 
capability” and “absorptive capacity” such as  R&D, patenting, scientific publications, ICT 
infrastructure, ISO 9000 certifications and  availability of finance.  However, it also 
correlates highly with education, so it cuts across the established distinction between 
“technological” and “social” capabilities. We suggest interpreting it as a synthetic measure of 
the quality of a country’s “innovation system”. Figure 2 plots the factor score on innovation 
system against GDP per capita (as a measure of the level of economic development). The first 
thing to note is the very tight correlation between the two, the quality of the innovation 
system “explains” more than 85 % of the variation in development. To the extent that there 
are some deviations from the regression line it comes from a group of resource rich 
economies (OPEC countries for instance),  having slightly higher GDP per capita levels than 
the quality of their innovation systems would indicate, and a group of the former centrally-
planned economies for which it is the other way around. 
 
                                               
21  The  method “principal component factors” (Stata 9.2) was used. This method returns as many factors as 
indicators, e.g., 25.  Factors with an eigenvalue above unity were retained for the second step of the analysis. 
This means that factors that explained less than an “average indicator” (1/25 = 4%) were dropped. The c oice of 
four factors was also found to be consistent with a Scree-test. An alternative method for identifying factors is 
based on the Maximum Likelihood approach. This method as the advantage that it has provides significace 
test for each factor. However, the method is known in many cases to converge to a corner solution (Heywood 
solution) in which case these tests are not valid (which happened in the present case).       
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Table 1  









Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 0.72 0.18 -0.08 -0.33 
USPTO patents (per capita) 0.63 0.32 0.14 -0.06 
Science & engineering articles (per capita) 0.64 0.40 0.06 -0.11 
ISO 9000 certifications (per capita) 0.80 0.04 0.00 0.29 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per capita) 0.92 -0.00 0.05 0.11 
Internet users (per capita) 0.78 -0.17 0.09 0.36 
Personal computers (per capita) 0.77 0.17 0.01 0.21 
Primary school teacher-pupil ratio 0.82 0.15 -0.08 -0.15 
Secondary school enrolment (% gross) 0.93 -0.09 0.04 -0.11 
Tertiary school enrolment (% gross) 0.94 -0.11 0.10 -0.14 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 0.48 0.44 0.00 0.09 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 0.42 0.33 0.06 0.26 
Merchandise imports (% of GDP) -0.08 0.04 -0.15 0.71 
Foreign direct investment inward stock (% of GDP)  0.02 0.02 0.08 0.86 
Impartial courts -0.07 0.86 -0.04 -0.10 
Law and order 0.22 0.58 -0.07 -0.01 
Property rights -0.01 0.88 0.16 0.02 
Regulation 0.10 0.72 0.05 0.02 
Informal Market (corruption) 0.26 0.68 -0.03 0.23 
Index of democracy and autocracy -0.03 -0.03 0.96 -0.05 
Political constraint 0.07 0.03 0.81 0.00 
Legislative index of political competitiveness -0.03 -0.19 0.84 0.01 
Executive index of political competitiveness 0.10 -0.24 0.83 0.01 
Political rights -0.01 0.23 0.89 -0.02 
Civil liberties 0.01 0.27 0.82 0.04 
Explained percentage of total variance  30.0 20.0 17.8 6.6 
 
Note: Four factors with eigenvalue > 1 were detected, which explain 74.4% of total variance; extraction method: 
principal components factors; rotation: oblimin oblique. Number of observations = 230 (pooled data for 115 countries in 
the initial and final period). 




Figure 2  
GDP per capita and innovation system (average level over 2002-2004) 
 
 
Note: For definition of the innovation system variable see Table 1. 
Source: See Appendix 1. 
 
A brief look at the next two factors, which each explains about one fifth of the total variance, 
reveals that the above mentioned difference between “governance” (or “policy”) on the one 
hand and “rules of the game” (or “institutions”) on the other are clearly mirrored in the 
results.  The second factor loads high on various aspects reflecting the quality of 
“governance”, such as a well-functioning judicial system, little corruption and a favourable 
environment for new businesses.  As in the previous ca e this factor score correlates 
positively with the level of economic development (and significantly so). However, as is 
evident from Figure 3, the relationship is not as strong as in the case of the innovation 
system. The main reason for this is that there is agroup of countries, mainly of African 
origin, that deviates from the main pattern by being much poorer than the quality of 
governance should indicate.   
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Figure 3 
GDP per capita and governance (average level over 2002-2004) 
 
 
Note: For definition of the governance variable see Table 1. 
Source: See Appendix 1. 
 
The third factor, in contrast, loads particularly high on a number of aspects reflecting the 
character of the “political system” (e.g., “rules of the game”). In short, countries with 
political systems that are close to those of the Western world, rank high on this dimension, 
while countries with systems that differ lot from Western democratic ideals, get a low mark. 
In contrast to the innovation system variable, however, the character of the political system is 
not closely correlated with levels of economic development. In fact, figure 4 reveals that 
some countries with distinctly “non-Western” (authoritarian) regimes do rather well 
economically. However, most countries cluster to the right in the figure (indicating a 
“Western” type political system) irrespective of their level of economic development.  
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Figure 4  
GDP per capita and political system (average level over 2002-2004) 
 
 
Note: For definition of the political system variable see Table 1. 
Source: See Appendix 1. 
 
Finally, there is a fourth factor which may be labelled “openness” as it shows high correlation 
with imports and inward FDI. Hence this factor picks up aspects that (in at least some 
versions of the arguments) are attributed to “absorptive capacity”. As noted this is a factor 
that is deemed especially important by followers of the “new growth theory”. However, this 
fourth factor contributes much less to the explanatio  of the total variance than do the three 
other factors (only about seven per cent). Nor is the composite variable based on this factor 
closely correlated with economic development in Figure 5. However, it is nevertheless 
important to retain this factor because the results confirm that it captures a distinct aspect of 




GDP per capita and openness (average level over 200-2004) 
 
 
Note: For definition of the openness variable see Table 1. 
Source: See Appendix 1. 
 
Although most indicators correlate with one composite variable only there are a few 
exceptions worth noting. For instance, supply of credit to the private sector correlates 
moderately with both Innovation System and Governance. This is not necessarily surprising. 
A well functioning banking system is obviously important for innovation, but it is arguably 
also intimately related to good governance. Scientific articles correlate highly with the 
Innovation system and (moderately) with Governance.  The latter may be explained by the fat 
that most scientific articles originate from public sector organisations or private research 
sponsored by the public sector. Thus, the results indicate that although  the quality of the 
Innovation System and that of Governance represent different aspects of reality (and it is 
possible to distinguish clearly between them) there is also to some extent a relationship 
between the two. The spread of internet correlates highly with the innovation system and 
moderately with Openness. The former clearly concords with our hypotheses but the latter 
makes sense too.  Arguably, openness (in an economic sense) should not only be about flows 
of goods and money across borders but also about flws of ideas (for which internet access 
comes in very handy). 
 
5. Capabilities and development  
To sum up the main findings so far, there appears to be a very strong relationship between the 
innovation system and the level of development, and the same holds to some extent for the 
relationships between governance and development. In contrast, openness and the character 
of the political system appear not to be strongly re ated to economic development, at least not 
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as measured here. However, such simple correlations may mask more complex relationships, 
so in a second step we carry out a multivariate regression of the relationship between the four 
capabilities previously identified and the level of economic development as reflected by GDP 
per capita. To avoid simultaneity bias in the estima es we use data from the initial period 
(average 1992-1994) for the four capabilities and the final period (average 2002-2004) for 
GDP per capita.  
 
As is customary in the literature we include, in addition to the capabilities mentioned above, a 
battery of indicators reflecting differences in georaphy, nature and history. After a screening 
of the recent literature on the role of such exogenus factors for growth (Acemoglu, et al. 
2002, Alesina, et al. 2003, Bloom, at al. 2003, Fearon 2003, Gallup, et al. 1999, Masters and 
McMillan 2003, Sachs, et al. 2004), the following fourteen variables were selected:  
longitude of country centroid, latitude of country centroid, log of surface area, access to 
ocean, land in desert ecozone, land in tropical ecozone, log of population density, ethnic 
fractionalization, religion fractionalization, malari  fatal risk, log of oil deposits per capita, 
mean soil suitability for rain fed crops, log of the number of people killed in natural disasters 
per capita and log of years since national independence (see Appendix 1 for details). We use 
a (backward) stepwise regression to identify the spcification with the best statistical 
properties.22  To test for the robustness of the results with respect to the composition of the 
sample we re-estimate this relationship with a robust regression technique, iteratively 
reweighted least squares. 23 
 
Table 2 presents the results from the regression analysis. Note that all variables are expressed 
in a common scale (standardized by deducting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation), which allows for direct comparisons of parameter values (beta coefficients are 
reported).24 The main result is that irrespective of choice of econometric method the 
development of the “innovation system” and the quality of “governance” are  positively and 
significantly associated with economic development.  For the two remaining capabilities 
there is no significant relationship. The introduction of indicators reflecting differences in 
nature, geography and history led to a slight increase in the explanatory power of the model 
and a slight decrease in the correlation between GDP per capita and the development of the 
Innovation System. Hence, these results confirm earlier findings that such differences do 
matter for economic development. Moreover, the results reached here indicate that one 
important reason for this may be that these differences influence the ability of a country to 
develop a well-functioning innovation system.    
                                               
22 The aim of the stepwise procedure (stepwise reg command in Stata 9.2) is eliminate (insignificant) variables 
that do not contribute to the explanatory power of the model (given a chosen significance level). At each step 
the stepwise method also attempts to reintroduce already eliminated variables to control for a possibility that 
some of them might become significant later on. We sp cified the threshold for removal at 20% significan e and 
the level for reintroducing a variable at 15%.  
23 Iteratively reweighted least squares is a robust regression technique, which assigns a weight to each 
observation, with lower weights given to outliers (rreg command in Stata 9.2).   
24 See Wooldridge (2002a, pp. 114-115). Another effect of the standardization is that sample average is equal to 
zero, which implies that in the OLS estimate by definition, the constant term equals zero as well.   
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Table 2 
Regression results – levels 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS 
Stepwise 
regression with 




Intercept .. .. 0.003 
 .. .. (0.11) 
Innovation system 0.84*** 0.70*** 0.75*** 
 (19.60) (15.56) (17.68) 
Governance 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 
  (3.70) (4.49) (4.18) 
Political system -0.03 .. .. 
  (0.82) .. .. 
Openness 0.04 .. .. 
  (1.32) .. .. 
Longitude of country centroid .. -0.06*** -0.06** 
 .. (2.84) (2.06) 
Access to ocean .. 0.09*** 0.10*** 
 .. (3.62) (3.39) 
Oil deposits .. 0.07** 0.07** 
  .. (2.54) (2.40) 
Ethnic fractionalization .. -0.11*** -0.08** 
 .. (3.37) (2.40) 
Natural disasters .. -0.04** -0.04 
 .. (2.22) (1.33) 
F 366.22 260.08 186.81 
R2 0.91 0.93 .. 
Observations 115 115 115 
Note: Depended variable is log of average GDP per capita over 2002-2004 (PPP, constant 2000 USD). The 
independent variables of capabilities (factor scores) are their lagged levels from the period 1992-1994. Absolute 
value of robust t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standardized variables used in the estimates (beta co fficients reported). 
 
In the discussion so far we have mainly examined th relationship between capabilities and 
development when measured in levels. However, can the results from the above analysis, 
e.g., the importance of the development of the Innovati n System and the quality of 
Governance for economic development, be sustained i a dynamic framework (e.g., explain 
differences in economic growth)?  It is worth noting that many contributions to the empirical 
literature on cross-country differences in growth performance, despite theoretical differences, 
share a common empirical framework. This framework, so-called Barro-regressions (Barro 
1991), consists of regressing economic growth against initial GDP per capita and a number of 
other factors that may be deemed relevant (for a cross-country sample). In this framework the 
GDP per capita variable measures the potential for catch-up (or convergence). The other 
variables represent factors that are assumed to be f importance for  (or “condition” ) the 
ability  to exploit  this potential.  Hence in the literature these factors are often dubbed 
“conditional factors”, and the growth-regressions with these factors included are interpreted 
as tests of so-called “conditional convergence”.25 We shall apply this framework here. As 
                                               
25  The first to introduce this technique to the study of growth and development was probably John Cornwall 
(1976). Cornwall used GDP per capita to measure the gap in technology between  frontier and the late-comer 
countries. The higher this gap, he pointed out, the higher the potential for high growth in late-comer countries 
through successful imitation of superior technology developed elsewhere. However, in his view, to exploit this 
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conditional factors we include the capabilities developed in this paper and the battery of 
indicators reflecting exogenous factors related to ge graphy, nature and history.  
 
Table 3 presents the results from the analysis. The first model (1) regresses the potential for 
catch-up (log of initial GDP per capita) and the changes in the capabilities on growth of GDP 
per capita. The development of the innovation system and the change in the quality of  
governance  from the preceding period were found to be highly significant, positive 
predictors of growth while the changes in the political system and openness were found to be 
uncorrelated with growth. However, the effect of the GDP per capita variable was not 
significant following traditional statistical criteria (5% level) and positive, e.g., indicating - if 
anything - “conditional divergence”. The model also predicts poorly. The second model (2) 
adds the initial levels of the capabilities along with their changes as posible “conditional 
factors”. In this set up both the level and change of the development of the innovation system 
and the quality of governance were found to be positive and significant predictors of growth, 
while as before the two remaining capabilities were found not to matter much. Moreover, the 
GDP per capita becomes significant and with the right sign. The explanatory power of the 
model increases significantly as well.  
 
In the third model (3) we add the fourteen exogenous variables previously introduced, 
reflecting differences in nature, geography and history. As earlier we use a  (backward) 
stepwise regression procedure to identify the model with the best statistical properties. Again, 
a healthy increase in the explanatory power of the model can be recorded, confirming our 
earlier result that such exogenous factors do indeed matter for  development. However, with 
these exogenous factors included the level of the innovation system is not any longer a 
significant factor for growth, and the estimated impact of the changes in  this level on growth 
is also much reduced (although still positive and significant).  Hence, these results lend 
further support to our previous finding  that, say, unfavourable factors related to nature, 
geography and history tend to hamper the development of well-working innovation system 
and with it the level of economic development more generally.  
 
To test for a potential endogeneity bias in the estimates, due to a possible feedback from 
economic growth (the dependent variable) on capability changes, we applied the Hausman 
(or Durbin–Wu–Hausman) test for endogeneity.26 This test is performed by first regressing 
each potentially endogenous explanatory variable on all exogenous variables (and 
instruments), and then, in a second step, including the residuals from these regressions as 
additional variables in a new regression of the original model.27 If some of the residuals come 
out as significant in this latter regression, we accept endogeneity of the variable and the 
model should be estimated by, say, two-stages leastsquares in order to obtain consistent 
results.  However, in the present case the test failed to provide evidence for such endogeneity 
problems . 
 
In the fourth and fifth columns we test for the robustness of the “best model” with respect to 
changes in the composition of the sample. The fourth model (4) applies, as before, a robust 
regression technique (iteratively reweighted least squares) while in the fifth model (5) 
twenty-five countries with political systems deviating a lot from Western ideals were 
                                                                                                                                       
gap countries needed to do additional investments (and that is where the “conditional” aspect comes in). See 
Fagerberg (1994) for an extended discussion. 
26 For further details see Wooldridge (2002b, pp 118- 22).  
27 The exogenous variables that were excluded from the “best” model by the stepwise regression  were used as 
instruments in the test. 
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removed. The results indicate that the results report d in the third model for the political 
system and openness variables are not robust to changes in the sample. The conclusion, 
therefore, must be that for these two variables there is not convincing evidence for a 
systematic relationship with economic growth, even when the impact of other variables have 
been accounted for. 28   
Table 3 
Regression results – growth 


















Intercept .. .. .. 0.02 .. 
 .. .. .. (0.33) .. 
Log of the initial GDP per capita  0.15* -0.83** -0.53***  -0.55***  -0.65***  
 (1.91) (2.31) (2.97) (3.59) (2.79) 
Innovation system .. 0.78** .. .. .. 
 .. (2.38) .. .. .. 
Governance .. 0.36*** 0.33** 0.36***  0.45** 
 .. (2.64) (2.27) (2.83) (2.44) 
Political system .. 0.06 -0.22** -0.23** 0.02 
 .. (0.58) (1.87) (2.18) (0.17) 
Openness .. 0.10 0.18** 0.11 0.19 
 .. (0.96) (2.11) (1.25) (1.63) 
∆ innovation system 0.31***  0.45***  0.24***  0.28***  0.23** 
 (3.50) (4.69) (2.88) (3.25) (2.40) 
∆ governance 0.36***  0.35***  0.33***  0.42***  0.28** 
 (3.74) (3.58) (3.11) (5.30) (2.07) 
∆ political system 0.10 0.12 .. .. .. 
 (1.38) (1.33) .. .. .. 
∆ openness  0.03 0.05 .. .. .. 
 (0.25) (0.33) .. .. .. 
Latitude of country centroid .. .. 0.12 0.13 0.16** 
 .. .. (1.58) (1.51) (2.01) 
Ethnic fractionalization .. .. -0.26*** -0.16* -0.23** 
 .. .. (2.43) (1.70) (2.01) 
Malaria fatal risk .. .. -0.37** -0.44*** -0.39** 
 .. .. (2.56) (3.58) (2.34) 
Land in desert ecozone .. .. -0.32*** -0.34***  -0.12 
 .. .. (3.63) (3.73) (1.34) 
Natural disasters .. .. -0.16*** -0.14* -0.23*** 
 .. .. (3.03) (1.82) (2.72) 
F 5.25 4.26 6.76 9.05 6.44 
R2 0.20 0.31 0.42 .. 0.41 
Observations 115 115 115 115 90 
 
Note: Depended variable is annual growth of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2000 USD) over 1992-2004. 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standardized variables used in the estimates (beta co fficients reported).  
 
                                               
 
 22 
6. Concluding remarks 
The point of departure of this paper has been the finding that income gaps in the global 
economy are widening rather than narrowing. In fact, historical research shows that this is a 
long run trend. However, there have always been examples of countries that have defied the 
trend and managed to catch up with the much richer ountries at the technology frontier, and 
this also holds for the period under investigation here. The reasons for this have been a matter 
of considerable controversy, though.  
 
However, in recent years the quality and availability of data on different aspects of 
development have improved a lot, and this might give researchers in this area an opportunity 
for investigating the reasons behind the large differences in economic performance in more 
depth. Attempting to exploit this opportunity this paper starts with an overview of the 
different approaches in the literature to the explanation of these differences and in particular 
the empirical indicators and methods that these diff rent approaches have highlighted. This 
led to the formulation of a synthetic empirical model and, with the help of factor analysis, the 
identification of  set of “capabilities” which might be assumed to be of critical importance for 
catch up. 
 
The following “capabilities” were identified  and measured with the help of data for twenty-
five different variables for 115 countries over the1992-2004 period:  
The development of the “innovation system” 
The quality of “governance”  
The character of the “political system” 
 “Openness” to technology/knowledge from abroad  
 
The first of these, “innovation system”, is a synthetic measure of some of the most critically 
important capabilities required in the global knowledge based economy. It includes  such 
things a skilled labour force, R&D resources, a well-d veloped ICT infrastructure and access 
to finance. The analysis conducted here suggests that a well developed “innovation system” is 
a must for countries that wish to succeed in catch up. There is a strong, significant and robust 
statistical relationship between (level and change of) GDP per capita on the one hand, and 
(level and change of) the “innovation system” on the other. Historical and descriptive 
evidence also suggest that countries that have succeeded in catch up have given a high 
priority to this dimension of development.  
 
Albeit a well developed “innovation system” emerges from the analysis as a clear priority no. 
1 for development, it is not sufficient. A well developed “innovation system” needs to be 
backed by good “governance” to succeed. Sometimes it is asserted that this is mainly a 
question of successfully “westernising” the political system, e.g., adapting to institutional 
arrangements that have proved to be successful in the United States and other western 
democracies.  This study finds the support for these a sertions to be rather weak. What is 
required, it seems, is the ability to continuously improve the “innovation system” and the 
quality of  “governance”  through the mobilization of human, financial and a ministrative 
resources, and this appears to have been possible in countries with quite different institutional 
arrangements. This conclusion does not only rest on statistical evidence but is also supported 
by historical research (consider for instance the recent performance of countries such as 
China and Vietnam, the Asian Tigers before the 1990s or pre-world-war-two Japan). Hence, 
the available econometric evidence seems to confirm what follows from casual observation, 
namely that the political and legal systems of successful countries (and unsuccessful ones as 
well) can differ a lot.   
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Another result from the study, consistent with previous research by Rodrik et al. (2004), is 
that there is little support for the argument that differences in “openness” matter a lot for 
development. This holds even, as in the present case, when country size was controlled for. 
This finding clearly runs counter to arguments based on “new growth theories” emphasizing 
the openness dimension as perhaps the single most iportant one for development. Note, 
however, that the results reached here does not necessarily invalidate the argument, central to 
these theories, that flows of ideas across borders are important for global growth. What the 
results imply, perhaps, is  that what matters for pe formance is not so much differential 
access to such flows as the ability to take advantage of them. Arguably this is an issue that 
may require further research. 
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Appendix 1 (data & sources) 
A brief overview of definitions, sources and time/country coverage of the indicators is given 
in the table below. The main source of data is the World Bank (World Development 
Indicators 2006), which combines various sources of data for a large sample of countries. The 
database has been complemented by data from other organizations such as UNESCO, 
UNCTAD, OECD, ISO, ITU, Heritage Foundation and others, and in addition datasets 
produced by research projects. National sources were only used for Taiwan if necessary and 
in a few cases for R&D data from developing countries. 
 
We originally collected data for all independent states (app. 175 countries) and a large pool of 
indicators (app. 100 indicators). The screening revealed that a group of (mostly least 
developed) countries suffers from a lot of missing data. Similarly data for a large number of 
relevant indicators are available only for a group f high (medium) income countries and/or 
only for the most recent period. A closer look, furthermore, revealed that some indicators 
suffer from high volatility (primarily in developing world), methodological changes over the 
period or are merely variations of each other. These indicators were then skipped. In order to 
strike a balance between the need to bring rich evidence for as many countries as possible and 
data availability and methodological coherence, we sel cted 115 countries (see Appendix 2 
for the full list of countries) and twenty-five indicators on capabilities (plus the fourteen 
„exogenous factors“ reflecting differences in geography, nature and history). We use the 
indicators in the form of three-year averages (1992-1 94 and 2002-2004) to limit influence of 
shocks and measurement errors occurring in specific years.  
 
Although the selected indicators have broad coverage, in some cases there were missing 
values that had to be dealt with. Missing values were most frequent for R&D expenditure, 
personal computers, the teacher-pupil ratio, market capitalization of listed companies and 
some of the governance indicators. A number of developing countries were not included in 
the early surveys of computers and Internet penetration. We assumed that the initial value 
was zero if these series started from less than one per mil. people later during the nineties (six 
observations for computers and eighteen observations for Internet). Some missing data on the 
market capitalization were filled by collecting information on Stock Markets of the World 
(www.escapeartist.com/stock/markets.htm). Countries without a stock market in a given 
period were given zero (a total of forty-five observations). The remaining missing data were 
estimated using the impute procedure in Stata 9.2 (see the Stata 9 Manual for details). We 
based the estimation on data for other indicators in the dataset. The proportion of data 
estimated by the procedure is given in the last column of the following table. 
 
It should be stressed that considerable care was taken to check the estimated data against 
observed figures in countries with similar characteris ics (level of development, region, 
history, etc.). In a few cases the estimated data would exceed the minimum observed value of 
an indicator elsewhere. In such cases we truncated the ata by replacing the estimated values 
by the minimum observed figure. Only data from 1993 onwards were used for the science 
and engineering articles for the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia countries due to 
problems of reporting in the early 1990s.  We also reversed the scale, while keeping the 
original range, for some indicators of governance and political system in order to have the 
indicator in increasing order (with low value signalling weak governance and vice versa). 
Note that this change of scale does not alter any property of the data but simplifies the 
interpretation of loadings in the factor analysis. 
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Indicator & definition Scaling Source Average over period 
% of data 
estimated 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): GDP converted to (constant 2000) international 
USD using purchasing power parity rates (PPP). 
per capita 






Research and development expenditure (R&D): Total (public and private) 
intramural expenditure on research and experimental development performed on the national 
territory. 
% of GDP 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2006), OECD (MSTI Database), UNESCO 





USPTO patents: Number of utility patents (patents for invention) granted by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The origin of a patent is determined by the residence 
of the first-named inventor. 





Science & engineering articles: Counts of articles published in journals classified 
and covered by Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). The 
article counts are based on fractional assignments. 
per capita 
U.S. National Science Foundation (Science 





ISO 9000 certifications: A family of standards approved by the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) that define a quality management and quality assurance 
program. 
p r capita 
International Organization for Standardization 





Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers: Telephone mainlines connecting a 
customer's equipment to the public switched telephone network (PSTN) and users of 
portable telephones that subscribe to an automatic public mobile telephone service by 
cellular technology providing access to the PSTN. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2006), ITU (World Telecommunication 





Internet users: Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. per capita 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2006), ITU (World Telecommunication 





Personal computers: Computers designed to be used by a single individual. per capita 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2006), ITU (World Telecommunication 





Primary school teacher-pupil ratio: The number of primary school teachers 
(regardless of their teaching assignment) divided by the number of pupils enrolled in primary 
school. 
ratio 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 






Secondary school enrolment: The ratio of the number of secondary students of all 
ages (gross) expressed as a percentage of the secondary school-age population. 
% gross 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 






Tertiary school enrolment: The ratio of the number of tertiary students of all ages 
(gross) expressed as a percentage of the tertiary school-age population. 
% gross 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 







Domestic credit to private sector: Financial resources provided to the private 
sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. 
% of GDP 








Market capitalization of listed companies: The share price times the number of 
shares outstanding (also known as market value) of domestically incorporated companies 
listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
% of GDP 






Merchandise imports: The c.i.f. value of goods received from the rest of he world. 
Goods simply being transported through a country (good in transit) or temporarily admitted 
(except for goods for inward processing) are not included. 
% of GDP 






Foreign direct investment (FDI) inward stock: A received investment that 
involves a long-term relationship and reflects a lasting interest in and control by a resident 
entity in one economy of an enterprise resident in a different economy. 





Impartial courts: The degree to which a trusted legal framework exists for private 
businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulation.  
index 
(0 to 10) 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004) - based on the 






Law and order: The degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions, to make and implement laws nd adjudicate disputes. 
index 
(0 to 10) 
PRS Group (International Country Risk 






Property rights: The degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights 
and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. The scale of the indicator has 
been reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation (Index of Economic 
Freedom, various issues) - based on the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (Country 





Regulation: How easy or difficult it is to open and operate a business. The scale of the 
indicator has been reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation (Index of Economic 
Freedom, various issues) - based on the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (Country 





Informal Market: The perceptions of people with regard to the extent of corruption, 
defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit. The scale of the indicator has been 
reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation (Index of Economic 
Freedom, various issues) - based on the 






Index of democracy and autocracy: The degree of autocracy versus democracy in 
increasing order (POLITY2 variable). 
index 
(-10 to 10) 





Political constraint: The extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor 
may lead to a change in government policy (POLCONIII variable). 
index 





Legislative index of political competitiveness: Competitiveness of elections into 
legislative branches (LIEC variable ). 
index 






Executive index of political competitiveness: Competitiveness for post in 
executive branches in government (EIEC variable). 
index 







Political rights: The degree to which people participate freely in the political process 
derived from standards by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The scale of the 
indicator has been reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Freedom House (Index of Freedom in the 





Civil liberties: The degree of the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state 
derived from standards by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The scale of the 
indicator has been reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Freedom House (Index of Freedom in the 





Longitude of country centroid: Longitude is measured from the Prime Meridian 
with positive values going east and negative values going west. 
degrees 





Latitude of country centroid: Latitude is measured from the equator, with positive 
values going north and negative values going south. 
degrees 





Surface area: Country’s total area, including areas under inland bo ies of water and 
some coastal waterways. 
Log of 
km2 





Access to ocean: Proportion of land within 100 km of the ocean coastline, excluding 
coastline in the arctic and sub-arctic region above the winter extent of sea ice. % 

















World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2006); missing data filled from UNEP (The 
GEO Data Portal) 
1992-2004 0 
Malaria fatal risk: Proportion of population at risk of contracting falciparum malaria. % Earth Institute (Jeffrey D. Sachs Malaria Dataset) 1996 0 
Ethnic fractionalization: The probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not belong to the same ethic group. 
index 
(0 to 1) 




Religion fractionalization: The probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not belong to the same religion. 
index 
(0 to 1) 












Mean soil suitability for rainfed crops: Mean proportion of each soil type that is 
moderately or very suitable for each of six rainfed crops. % 





Killed in natural disasters: Number of persons killed (confirmed as dead, missing 
and presumed dead) in disasters of natural origin (droughts, earthquakes, extreme 




UNEP (The GEO Data Portal) – based on the 




National independence: Number of years since gaining national independence over 
the period 1816-2004 (maximum truncated at 188 years). 
Log of 
years  
Fearon (2003); missing data filled from the 




Appendix 2 (factor scores) 
Innovation 



















































Australia 0.9 1.6 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Austria 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.8 -0.8 0.3 
Belgium 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.5 1.2 
Canada 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 1.3 
Denmark 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 0.8 0.8 -0.9 0.1 
Finland 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.8 0.8 -0.9 0.3 
France 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 -0.6 0.4 
Germany 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.8 -1.0 0.1 
Greece 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.7 -0.7 -0.2 
Ireland 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 
Israel 1.0 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 -1.2 -0.2 
Italy 0.9 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 -1.2 -0.1 
Japan 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 -3.1 -1.6 
Netherlands 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.1 
New Zealand 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Norway 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.8 -0.4 -0.2 
Portugal 0.4 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 -0.1 0.6 
Spain 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 -0.5 0.6 
Sweden 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.8 -0.7 0.6 
Switzerland 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.9 -0.4 0.4 
United Kingdom 0.9 1.5 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.8 -0.2 0.3 
United States 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.5 0.8 0.8 -0.8 0.0 
Asian Tigers 
Korea 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.7 -1.2 -0.1 
Singapore 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 -0.6 -0.6 1.3 1.7 
Taiwan 0.7 1.4 1.6 0.8 -0.2 0.7 -0.7 0.1 
New EU Members 
Czech Republic 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.2 
Estonia 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.7 -0.6 1.6 
Hungary 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.7 -0.5 1.1 
Latvia 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.7 -1.1 0.7 
Lithuania 0.0 1.0 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.7 -1.0 0.8 
Poland 0.2 1.0 0.4 -0.1 0.5 0.7 -1.3 0.6 
Slovakia 0.3 0.9 0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.7 -0.8 1.2 




Bahrain 0.3 0.8 1.7 1.2 -3.0 -2.4 0.1 0.5 
Iran -0.4 0.7 -1.3 -2.0 -1.7 -0.8 -1.0 -0.7 
Jordan -0.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 -0.6 -0.9 0.0 1.1 
Kuwait 0.0 0.9 1.4 0.9 -1.3 -1.0 -2.1 -1.3 
Oman -0.6 0.4 1.4 0.7 -2.6 -2.4 -0.2 0.4 
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.9 1.4 0.4 -3.7 -3.6 0.0 0.1 
Syria -0.7 0.1 -0.7 -1.4 -2.5 -1.8 -0.9 0.1 
Turkey -0.3 0.6 0.3 -0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.8 0.5 
United Arab Emirates 0.2 1.0 1.6 1.1 -2.8 -2.9 -0.2 0.2 
Latin America 
Argentina 0.2 1.0 0.4 -1.1 0.7 0.7 -1.2 0.4 
Bolivia -0.6 0.4 -0.8 -1.5 0.6 0.6 -0.4 1.2 
Brazil -0.1 0.7 0.3 -0.3 0.6 0.7 -1.0 0.3 
Chile 0.0 0.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.2 1.3 
Colombia -0.3 0.3 -0.7 -1.1 0.6 0.3 -0.6 0.7 
Costa Rica -0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.8 
Dominican Republic -0.7 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 0.4 0.6 -0.9 0.3 
Ecuador -0.6 0.2 -0.6 -1.5 0.4 0.5 -0.5 1.0 
El Salvador -0.9 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 0.5 -1.0 0.4 
Guatemala -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.6 -0.1 0.3 -0.5 0.3 
Guyana -1.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 2.2 
Honduras -1.0 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 0.5 0.5 -0.2 1.1 
Jamaica -0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.1 
Mexico -0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.1 
Nicaragua -0.8 -0.1 -0.9 -1.4 0.2 0.5 -0.2 1.5 
Panama -0.3 0.6 0.1 -0.7 0.5 0.8 -0.1 0.7 
Paraguay -1.0 0.1 -0.3 -2.1 0.4 0.5 -0.7 0.8 
Peru -0.4 0.4 -1.0 -1.3 0.0 0.7 -1.1 0.5 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.3 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.6 -0.4 0.9 
Uruguay -0.1 0.6 0.2 -0.1 0.8 0.9 -1.3 -0.1 
Venezuela 0.0 0.8 -0.3 -2.5 0.5 0.5 -0.4 0.5 
East Europe & CIS 
Albania -0.8 0.0 -0.7 -1.5 0.3 0.5 -1.6 -0.6 
Armenia -0.4 0.4 -0.3 -0.8 0.1 0.1 -1.3 0.3 
Belarus 0.0 1.0 -0.2 -1.5 -0.6 -2.4 -3.2 0.5 
Bulgaria 0.2 0.9 0.1 -0.7 0.5 0.7 -1.3 0.9 
Croatia 0.3 1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.5 -1.2 0.8 
Georgia -0.3 0.5 -1.3 -1.4 -0.6 0.3 -3.1 -0.1 
Moldova -0.4 0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 -1.9 0.9 
Romania -0.1 0.8 -0.8 -1.1 0.2 0.6 -2.1 0.8 
Russia 0.1 1.1 -0.4 -1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.9 0.5 




Algeria -0.7 0.0 -0.5 -1.1 -2.5 -0.4 -1.2 -0.1 
Egypt -0.2 0.5 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.1 0.2 
Morocco -0.9 -0.3 0.9 0.1 -1.0 -0.9 0.2 1.7 
Tunisia -0.6 0.5 0.8 0.4 -1.4 -1.4 0.8 1.2 
South-East Asia 
China -0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -2.7 -2.4 -0.1 1.0 
Indonesia -0.8 0.0 -0.4 -1.1 -1.9 0.3 -0.3 0.0 
Malaysia -0.1 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.7 2.0 
Philippines -0.5 0.2 -0.5 -1.1 0.4 0.5 -0.3 1.1 
Thailand -0.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.6 1.5 
Vietnam -1.3 0.2 -2.2 -1.9 -2.5 -1.9 -0.3 1.5 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
Benin -2.1 -1.2 0.2 -0.8 0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 
Botswana -1.0 -0.1 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 
Burkina Faso -2.2 -1.4 -0.9 -0.5 -1.4 -0.4 -1.4 -1.2 
Cameroon -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 -1.5 -0.9 -1.1 -1.4 -0.5 
Congo -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -0.1 -0.8 -0.2 1.4 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.1 -0.5 0.1 -1.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 0.6 
Ethiopia -1.9 -1.3 -0.4 -0.7 -1.8 -0.2 -1.6 0.8 
Ghana -1.4 -0.8 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 0.5 -0.2 1.1 
Guinea -2.0 -1.2 0.1 -1.3 -2.1 -0.3 -1.3 -0.5 
Kenya -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -0.7 0.5 -0.1 0.3 
Madagascar -1.8 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 0.3 0.5 -1.5 -0.2 
Malawi -2.6 -1.4 0.0 -0.2 -1.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 
Mali -2.3 -1.7 -0.5 -0.6 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.8 
Mozambique -2.3 -1.8 -0.7 -1.2 -1.3 0.4 0.0 2.1 
Namibia -1.0 -0.2 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.2 1.5 
Niger -2.3 -1.9 -0.8 -1.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.2 
Nigeria -1.4 -0.6 0.0 -1.3 -2.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 
Senegal -1.7 -1.0 0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.5 -0.5 0.9 
South Africa 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.3 1.0 
Tanzania -2.1 -1.7 0.3 -0.4 -1.3 0.1 0.4 1.6 
Togo -1.5 -0.7 -0.7 -1.8 -1.4 -0.9 -0.9 0.4 
Uganda -1.7 -0.9 0.4 -0.4 -1.7 -0.7 -1.7 0.1 
Zambia -1.6 -1.3 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.8 
Zimbabwe -0.9 -0.1 0.2 -2.5 -0.8 -1.3 -0.9 1.4 
Central Asia 
Bangladesh -1.5 -0.5 -1.5 -2.0 0.6 0.3 -2.3 -0.7 
India -0.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.6 -2.3 -0.5 
Mongolia -0.8 0.0 0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.1 1.8 
Nepal -1.3 -0.6 -0.7 -1.1 0.3 -0.7 -2.1 -0.9 
Pakistan -1.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 0.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.2 
Sri Lanka -0.9 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.2 
Oceania 
Papua New Guinea -1.6 -1.1 0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 2.3 
Fiji -0.5 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.2 
 
Note: For definition of the variables see Table 1. 
 
